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Abstract: In 1981 Saltzer, Reed, and Clark identified

1.0 Introduction

“end-to-end” principles related to the design of modern
layered protocols. The Internet today is not as transparent as envisioned by [SALTZER81]. While most of the intelligence remains concentrated in end-systems, users are
now deploying more sophisticated processing within the
network for a variety of reasons including security, network management, E-commerce, and survivability. Applications and application-layer protocols have been
found to interact in unexpected ways with this new intelligent software within the network such as proxies, address
translators, packet filters, intrusion detection, and differentiated service functions. In this paper we survey examples of the problems caused by the introduction of this
new processing within the network which is counter to the
end-to-end Internet model proposed by [SALTZER81].

There are two classic models for intelligence within
networks.[LEAR00] The first is end-systems that have no
intelligence and the network devices to which they connect provide all the services. The telephone system is an
example of just such a network. The absence of intelligence in end-devices makes them inexpensive to manufacture and manage but the network devices (central office switches) become expensive and complex to
maintain.
The second model is the end-to-end Internet model4
proposed by Saltzer, Reed, and Clark in 1981.
[SALTER84] This model is a set of architectural principles that guide the placement of functions within a distributed system. According to this principle, lower layers
of a distributed system should avoid attempting to provide
functions that can be implemented in end-systems especially if the function cannot be completely implemented
in lower layers and some applications might not benefit
from such functions at all.

*123

The conflict between the end-to-end Internet model
and the introduction of new processing within the network
is being addressed on a case-by-case basis in each development effort. There are no indications that new devices
installed within the network (which break the end-to-end
model) will disappear and in fact there has been dramatic
growth in their implementation due to recent denial-ofservice attacks. Transition to IPv6 only solves a subset of
these issues, and its deployment is proceeding slowly. Future work is obviously needed to create a consistent environment for protocol development that preserves the
transparency provided by the end-to-end Internet model.

The end-to-end model shifts intelligence to the endsystems, thus also shifting cost and management complexity from routers/switches to end-systems. Another
benefit of the end-to-end model is congestion control can
be managed between end-systems, not requiring state information be kept within routers such that network devices can be optimized for performance.5 In end-to-end
design, the network simply acts as a transparent transport
mechanism for individual packets with each packet being
labeled by a globally unique source/destination addresses.
The notion of “transparency” demands that network devices between two end-systems not modify information
within the packet above layer 2 (data link layer), except
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we use the term “end-to-end model” while acknowledging that the original authors prefer to use the terminology
“end-to-end arguments”
5
noted Internet researcher Van Jacobson is quoted as stating, “Very simple. A router has only three choices when
presented with a packet. It can transmit the packet. It can
delay (queue) the packet. Or it can throw the packet
away.” [CHEN98]
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under well-defined circumstances (i.e., decrement the
TTL or record route). Changing IP addresses is not
viewed as acceptable, nor is any change to layer 4 or
above.

we accept the notion that such devices are here to stay for
the short-term and that the transparency of the end-to-end
model as we know it can not be re-established through requirements of their non-existence. The end-to-end Internet model is broken and needs to be repaired. The problem is acerbated in that it is impossible to detect
intelligent network devices and there now actually exists
guidance within the IETF itself on how to build such devices.

2.0
The Problem: Unexpected Protocol Interactions
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has
been instrumental in supporting the end-to-end Internet
model with “rough consensus and working code.”6 In
fact, one of the authors of the original end-to-end model
paper, David Clark, chaired the Internet Activities Board
(IAB) overseeing the IETF from 1981 to 1989. In reflecting on the state of the Internet in late 1999, a current
member of the IAB and present/past chair of numerous
IETF working groups, Steve Deering7, summarized his
thoughts on intelligence within networks with a slide “Internet is Losing?”8 Examples he used include:
•
•
•

While IP next generation, IPv6, has been designed to
solve many of these problems, migration will take time.
Not only do protocol stacks and routers have to be upgraded but applications with hard-coded IPv4 addresses
have to be changed (an effort similar to Y2K without a
hard deadline). The good news is that IPv6 has been designed so that IPv4 and IPv6 can coexist with IPv6 deployed gradually. In the meantime, applications and application-layer protocols have been found to interact in
unexpected ways with intelligent network devices within
the current end-to-end IPv4 Internet model. This is to be
expected since intelligent network devices reduce transparency and the key element of transparency is some ability to predict how the network will behave.[CHEN98] To
quote from a 1998 paper from the original authors of the
end-to-end model:

unique IP addresses are no longer necessary
the Internet is not always on (many users log-on via
American On-Line etc.)
end-to-end transparency is often blocked behind network address translators and firewalls

“Since lower-level network resources are shared among
many different users with different applications, the complexity of potential interactions among independent users
rises with the complexity of the behaviors that the users or
applications can request. For example, when the lower
layer offers a simple store-and-forward packet transport
service, interactions take the form of end-to-end delay
that can be modeled by relatively straightforward queueing models. Adding priority mechanisms (to limit the
impact of congestion) that are fixed at design time adds
modest complexity to models that predict the behavior of
the system. But relatively simple programming capabilities, such as allowing packets to change priority dynamically within the network, may create behaviors that
are intractable to model….”[CHEN98]

While most of the intelligence remains concentrated
in end-systems, users are increasingly deploying more sophisticated processing within the network for a variety of
reasons including security, network management, Ecommerce, and survivability. The following are some
specific examples:
•
•
•
•
•

The use of network address translators to solve IP
address depletion problems.
The use of performance enhancing proxies to tune
protocols on links with unusual characteristics.
The use of tunneling and other virtual private network techniques to provide secure connectivity over
the Internet to an organization’s intranet/extranet.
The use of firewalls and intrusion detection to prevent and respond to malicious attacks.
The deployment of quality-of-service mechanisms to
provide delay, delay jitter, and packet loss guarantees
to applications and network services.

Thus, maintaining the largest degree of network transparency simultaneously constrains interactions among different users of a shared lower level such that network behavior can be predicted. We have also found the opposite is
true: diminishing transparency increases unexpected interactions between protocols. We have identified three
distinct types of protocol interactions that have been introduced by the diminishing of transparency due to the
deployment of intelligent network devices:

Each of these examples address important problems
that need to be solved. Rather than debate the benefit of
each such device and or their legitimacy with the network,
6

motto of the IETF
Steve Deering is also the inventor of IP multicast and
lead designer of the next generation Internet Protocol
(IPv6).
8
Closing Talk of Networked Group Communications
Conference (NGC’99), Pisa Italy, Nov. 19, 1999.
7

•
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Some network devices either attempt to read/modify
portions of transmitted packets which the sending
system assumes fixed. [i.e., performance enhancing
proxies, network address translators]

•

•

PEPs are used in networks with unusual link characteristics.[ALLMAN99] These proxies may attempt to read
transport-level information in the packet or they may add
and delete packets from the flow. Many of these proxies
can be bypassed by flows that do not permit such interactions, at risk of suffering from poor performance. Both
NAT and PEP devices vastly complicate the deployment
of IP-level security between end-systems [KRUSE99],
and they may cause other failures that can be difficult to
diagnose [CARPENTER00]. For instance, both the NAT
and PEP devices usually do not report the fact that they
either failed to correctly handle a packet, were bypassed,
or dropped a packet they could not process due to insufficient information. Encrypted packets will be examined
by the security software at the receiving end where modifications made by the NAT or PEP device will be interpreted as illegal tampering and the packet will be discarded by the security software. While dropping packets
is an auditable event, the sender of the packet is usually
not notified.

The use of IP tunnels creates the design issue of how
to construct the second “outer” IP header upon tunnel
ingress9, and the more complicated issue of whether
the original “inner” IP header needs to be modified
upon tunnel egress10 based on changes that intermediate nodes made to the outer header.[i.e., tunneling
and virtual private networks]
Some devices on purpose, or due to limits in their design, prevent some packets from traversing that device. [i.e., firewalls, intrusion detection]

In this paper we examine these protocol interactions
in an effort to understand recent protocol design decisions
and their effect on the transparency provided by the endto-end Internet model. We are particularly interested in
examining the protocol structures involved to determine
why the traditional protection against protocol interactions inherent in the layered protocols could not prevent
the observed problems. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 3 describes the use and interaction of network address translators and performance
enhancing proxies. Section 4 examines the use of tunneling to create virtual private networks. Section 5 discusses
the use and interaction of packet filtering/correlation with
firewalls and intrusion detection devices and the implications of IPsec. Section 6 discusses the use and interactions of proposed quality-of-service mechanisms. In Section 7 we close with a summary and directions for future
work.

The deployment of NAPT devices is usually driven
by a shortage of IPv4 addresses, and the resulting ISP
policies and rates that limit the number of permanent addresses a user can acquire. IPv6 deployment is the obvious, but long-term, solution to this issue. PEP devices are
introduced for different reasons and will continue to exist
in the IPv6 network.

4.0
Tunneling and Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)

3.0 Network Address Translators (NATs) /
Performance Enhancing Proxies (PEPs)

IP tunnels are defined as a section of the network in
which IP packets are encapsulated inside a second IP
header (often called the “outer header”). The tunnel is
designed to transport packets between two intermediate
points in the network, without making reference to the actual IP packets during the tunnel section of the packet’s
path. Tunnels can serve a number of purposes including:

NATs allow the use of private IP addresses in a private intranet while maintaining connectivity to the Internet through one or more global IP addresses. Since many
applications assume that the end-system address is globally unique, NATs usually require application level gateways which modify application-specific sections of the
packet where the end-system address has been embedded.
These gateways cause changes in the packet that are
unanticipated
by
the
end-systems.[HAIN00,
HOLDREGE00] A Network Address and Port Translator
(NAPT) cannot forward a connection request from the
Internet to a private network unless an administrative
mapping has been provided for the port requested in the
incoming packet. Other packets may be dropped or misrouted because the NAPT does not have the appropriate
application-level gateway and thus fails to make corrections in the packet to allow the application’s peer to respond.11

•

•

Transport of multiple protocols over an IPv4 router
infrastructure (i.e., IPv6, IPX, Appletalk) as well as
service types not supported by intermediate nodes
(i.e., multicast backbone or MBONE).
Tunnels provide secure passage between two nodes at
the edges of trusted domains. Inside the tunnel,

time, the actual IP addresses of such users is purely transient. During their period of validity they can be relied
upon end-to-end but these IP numbers have no permanent
associations with the domain name of any host and are
recycled for reuse at the end of every session. Similarly,
LAN-based users typically use DHCP (Dynamic Host
Control Protocol) to acquire a new address at system restart

9

ingress is a path going into a network
egress is a path exiting from a network
11
It should also be noted that with the advent of dial-up
Internet users whose IP address is allocated at dial-up
10
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•

Intrusion detection (ID) is a monitoring and auditing
system for attempted and successful system breaches with
the goal of detecting and ultimately preventing such activity. Because many attacks can be recognized by their signature (headers), the best place to process information is
at the network layer. Since ID is based on algorithms
which correlate network layer information with signatures, it requires large amounts of storage. The state-ofthe-art is reactive off-line processing. ID systems are
currently maturing and the next generation will rely on
integration with routers to proactively monitor activity in
real-time. One example of a transparency issue related to
ID systems is fragmentation. While fragmentation is a
useful method for supporting various media on internetworks, it may mean caching packets at the ID system to
reassemble for inspection – a process that destroys transparency and could be a performance bottleneck.

original IP packets are encrypted and therefore completely inaccessible.
Creation of VPNs. In this scheme, packets between
two sites are carried over IP tunnels to provide isolation from the addressing and routing requirements of
the Internet. A similar type of tunnel can be used to
connect an off-site user to the corporate network.

The use of tunnels creates specific types of protocol
interaction problems. Specifically how should the outer
IP header be constructed at the tunnel ingress point? In
general it seems reasonable to copy fields from the original IP header, however, this is not always the correct approach. In networks that provide quality of service control through resource reservation [TERZIS00] or
differentiated service [BLAKE98], the tunnel may be
used to traverse a portion of the network that cannot provide these services, and therefore requires that some of
the original IP settings not be copied. In other cases
[FLOYD00], the ability of the tunnel egress point to provide certain types of processing will determine how to
construct the outer IP header.

At the other end of the spectrum from filtering and
correlating packets is security. IPsec is actually an architecture - a collection of protocols, authentication, and encryption mechanisms – as described in [KENT98]. The
loss of transparency is both a bug and a feature from the
security standpoint. To the extent it prevents the end-toend deployment of IPsec, it damages security and creates
vulnerabilities. For example, if a NAT is in the path, the
best that can be done is to decrypt and re-encrypt IP traffic in the NAT with the traffic momentarily in plaintext.
Noting NATs are prime targets for attack already, this is
unacceptable. Indeed, NATs break other security mechanisms as well, such as Kerberos and DNSSEC, since they
rely upon address values. In a weaker sense, the loss of
transparency at an Intranet/Internet boundary may be considered a security feature since it is a well-defined point to
enforce security policy. However, such a security strategy is vulnerable to insider attack and boundary penetrations which expose the entire intranet to trivial attack.
Lastly, where cryptographic algorithms are used, protocols should be designed to permit alternative algorithms
to be used. There have been several efforts by corporations to embed their own patented cryptographic algorithms within a protocol to capture a market while at the
same time severely limiting end-to-end transparency.

By far the more complicated issues arise upon tunnel
egress. Some portions of the outer IP header may have
been modified during tunnel traversal. Examples include
updating of header fields that mark the packet as being in
a particular differentiated service group, or updating of
fields designed to provide explicit congestion notification
to end-points. The tunnel egress node must merge the
original IP header with the – possibly modified – outer IP
header. The rules for doing this are ambiguous and different rules may emerge. For example, from a performance and application perspective, one may wish to propagate congestion notification information across security
tunnels. From a security perspective, one may wish to
discard the outer IP header, regardless of its content, to
prevent attacks based on the ability of hostile systems to
modify the unprotected outer IP header inside the tunnel.

5.0
sec

Firewalls, Intrusion Detection, and IP-

Several devices discard packets before they reach the
end-system destination address. Most prominently, firewalls are designed to do just that for all packets that have
not been entered in a permission list. Firewalls, by their
very nature, fundamentally diminish transparency. Typically the source is not notified of the fact that the packet
was dropped (although auditing of dropped packets can be
performed at the firewall). In order to prevent attacks,
many corporate firewalls will not permit network management packets (i.e., ICMP) to pass through. Note that
these issues are unrelated to the availability of address
space, and will continue into the IPv6 network.

6.0

Quality-of-Service (QoS) Mechanisms

Classically, the end-to-end model views the network as a monolithic entity that provides a single QoS to
all users, best-effort delivery. The Internet has expanded
to incorporate applications with requirements for guarantees on network behavior beyond the best-effort delivery.
In the case of mechanisms such as RSVP, the host signals
to the network the level of service it requires, whereas
with differentiated services the network prioritizes traffic
without the host’s knowledge or consent.[BRADEN97,
BLAKE98] Both end-systems and network devices co-

533

operate to provide deterministic and statistical guarantees
on QoS metrics such as delay, delay jitter variation, and
packet loss rates.

solution to this debate will determine the utility of the
Internet and its future as the next generation infrastructure.

7.0
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